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Illustrating a Behaviorally Informed
Approach to Antitrust Law:
The Case of Predatory Pricing
BY AVISHALOM TOR
NE OF THE CORE ASSUMPTIONS
6 ofthe traditional economic approach to antitrust
law is that competitors are perfectly rational,
irofh-niaxitnizitg, decision makers.' Sometimes
this assumlption serves as a useful simplification
of business behavior, providing an effective fiundation for
antitrust doctrine. At other times, however, assuiling strict-
ly rational behavior on the part of competitors is not "approx-
inately right" but, instead, "perfectly wrong." 2 In these lat-
ter cases, the reliance on the perfect rationality assumption
can lead scholars to mispredict market behavior and, possi-
bly, advocate erroneous prescriptions for antitrust policy.
In contrast, a behaviorally informed approach to antitrust
law is based on scientific findings regarding actual human
behavior. The hallmark of behavioral law and economics is
the replacement ofhomo econonicus-the perfectly rational
actor-with a "boundedly rational" decision maker who,
apart from being affected by emotion and motivation, has
only limited cognitive resources." To funcion effectively in a
complex world, boundedly rational actors must rely on var-
ious simplil'ing cognitive heuristics. Even when they are,
overall, beneficial and often correct, however, these mental
rules-of-thumb inevitably lead people to make some system-
atic decision errors, such that their behavior deviates from
rational actor models in predictable ways.'
Potentially, empirical findings on boundedly tational judg-
ment and decision making can provide better descriptions of
market behavior and more effective prescriptions for com-
petition policy than those based on the often unrealistic the-
oretical assumpt ions of rational actor modcls.' 1 n the ouotext
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of antitrust law, moreover, systematic deviations of market
participants' behavior from neo-classiCal tssUnptions are
especially important:" Actual behavioral patterns of judg-
ment and decision making reveal that certain anticompetitive
practices are more or less likely to occur than the traditional
economic approach deems. In considering Section 2 preda-
tory pricing behaviot, for instance, if managers of dominant
fittts wete shwn I Ie isk seeking-that is, engaging in
negative expected valttc business practices-under certain
circumstances, sonit costly predatory pricing could occu
even where recoupment prospects are dim. With respect ro
antitrust law in general, a behavioral approach may reveal that
some business practices are altogether more or less anticoul-
petitive than previously thought.'
The Perfectly Rational Actor In Antitrust Analysis
Over tile last few decades, law and economics scholarship has
reshaped the theory and doctrine of antitrust law. ' By apply-
ing nIclassical niclroecononics, scholars were able to iatio-
naliz.e and systematize antitrust law, which previously has
been viewed as conttfused anI paracdoxical-laLki og clear and
tractable policy objectives ;ttd the means consistently to catty
out such objectives. Law and ecncomics has brought coher-
ence to antitrust by relying on a rational actor model to pre-
dict the behavior of individuals and firms in the market,
Perfectly rational actors always maximize the utility of
their decisions. In the context of antitrust law, rational actors
are assumed to hold to an even narrower precept: they always
tnaxilize piofits (i.e., the monetary value of their actions),"
making optilmal decisions in lu rthetance oftheit businesses'
interests when engaging in their various market activities.
Such hypothetical rational actors miake no syst ematic errors
when judging the risks, costs, atd beitefits of different busi-
ness practices; nor do they ever shy front financially attratcive
but risky behaviors or engage in high-risk business piactices
with a negative expected valte "against the odds."
Joining the rational actor framework with the policy goal
of promoting efficiency, practitioners of traditional antitrust
law and economics determine whether the predicted market
55 A N I I I" U S I
behavior will have anritcompetitive efficiency consequences.
Based on this approach, the leading proponents of the
"Chicago School" have used neoclassical economic insights
successfutlly to argue that only a limited number of cases
rightly concern the antitrust laws.'" Chicago School schol-
ars have made the case, for example, that predatory pricing
would rarely take place in a world where all market partici-
pants-be they dominant firms, small competitors, or
potential ct rants-are strictly rational. In a rational world,
these scholars have maintained, the difficulty of recoup-
mrent following predation makes predatory pricing ext reme-
ly unlikely.
Despite the trcnendous inpact Chicago School scholar-
ship has had ott the courts ad the enfolrcement agencies
alike, however, nany scholars and practitioners o antittust
law harbor reservations about this approach. They often find
its specific applications unrealistic and divorced from obser-
vations in actual markets, tending to obscure the significance
of dynamic considerations, asymmetric infortnation, and
strategic behavior.''
The behavioral approach provides a foundation for anti-
trust law and economics capable of improving our under-
standing of real world behavior in markets and the policy pre-
scriptions that follow from it. The potential contribution of
the behavioral approach to antitrust analysis is aso unique in
ilportant ways. First, it challenges traditional findings by
building its analyses on more realistic behavioral flounda-
tions, instead of assuming an even greater degree of strategic
sophistication otn the part of business decision makers than
that imputed to then in neoclassical econom ics.'- Second, a
behaviorally informed approach is, above all, empirically
grounded; depending oti the relevant evidence, advocates of
a behavioral approach may find-even when solely consid-
ering the efficiency effects ofdifferent busitess practices-a
fieeater degree of interventton in stome instances and a lesser
degree in others, when conmpared to more ttaditiunal eco-
iolnic analyses of;antitrttst law. For instance, while suggest-
ing that predamry bchavior ay lie more conn (fl th) I the
rattinal actor models predict, the hehaviiral evidence also
indicates that establishing either partial collaboration or col-
lusiou aniong oligopolistic rivals with no history of cooper-
ation may he more difficult than otherwise recognized."
Some Behavioral Basics
The behavioral findings on judgment and decision making
relevant to antitrust analysis, overall, call be divided into two
main categories: The first includes the evidence of'systemat-
ic biases in judgments of probabilities, risks, costs, and ben-
efits tinder uncertainty; the second encompasses those behav-
ioral findings showing systematic violations of strict profit
(ie., expected value) maximization in decision making.
While behavioral research has catalogued an extensive set of
findings on errors in judgment and decision making, 4 this
article focuses on a smaller set of Findings that apply to preda-
tory pricing.
Biases in Judgments of Risks, Costs, and Benefits.
Systematic biases in judgments of risks, costs, and benefits
may emanate either from purely cognitive processes or from
any combination of motivational, emotional, and cognitive
fatctors. This category includes situations where decision mak-
ers' judgments of the nature, likelihood, or magnitude of
events systematically (and predictably) deviate from the nor-
mative standards ofrational judgment. For example, decision
makers judge events that are easier to imagine or recall from
memory as mtre likely to occur-a heuristic known as avail-
ability. In most circumstances, availability is a reasonable
rule of thumb for determining the probability of events,
since more common events typically are better remembered
and imagined. Availability, howcvcr, also leads to predictable
biases because inore vivid ("hero stories" and "horror stories")
or recetit experiences, for example, are easier to recall regard-
less of their frequency. Due to this availability bias, the dra-
matic success of a particular business venture will generate an
upward bias in expectations regarding similar ventures
because the "hero story" is better remembered than the less
vivid fate of many other comparable ventures."
Another important judgmental shortcut is the representa-
titveness heuristic, by which decision makers categorize events
and make judgments about them, based on the degree to
which an observed outcome or event represents a model or
a category. For instance, decision makers will tend to overes-
timate the likelihood that a manager who closely resembles
the "successftl manager" prototype will be succc.sfil in a very
difficult task, while disregarding or giving insufficiet weight
to information about how dificult the task generally is.
Animng its various effects on judgintir and prediction, the
represetttativeness heuristic also leads decision makers to
extrapolate from their observations of somall sinples u the
pipulatiun at large. Market I-articipants will ths tcud to
treat their limited observations as highly representative Ofthe
population, even bhough probability theory (caches that this
"law of small numbers" is unreliable because small samples
can displ;ty average characteristics that are very different from
the mean of the poptulation as a whole.'lb illustrate, ifa new
marketing strategy has been successful in a few cases, market
participants will tend overestimate its overall efficacy and
likelihood of success on other future occasions.
While the heuristics commonly used to categorize events
and judge their likelihood lead to predictable biases, decision
makers also commonly overweight-that is, give too much
importance to-small, known probabilities. This phenom-
enon is often reinforced when unlikely events are salient or
dramatic and, therefore, highly available and overestimated.'
In addition to exhibiting biases due to reliance on cogni-
tive heuristics, the empirical evidence from behavioral
research shows that motivation and aflect also impact busi-
ness judgments. Exhibiting optimistic overconfidence, for
example, market participants tend to overestimate their busi-
ness ability, skill, and petformance and their likelihood of
experiencing positive events, and tinderestimate their per-
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sonal vulnerability to certain risks. For instance, decision
makers tend to overestimate the predicted performance of
their investments relative to the market. They have even been
shown to overestimate the actual past performance of their
porinfolios and to switch their intvestmnetts too frequently (a
behavior correlated with poorer performance).11
Boundedly Rational Choice Behavior, Cognitive
heuristics, motivational forces, and affect can all bias decision
makers' judgments of probability and value tinder tncer-
tainty. After making such judgments (or where reliable and
unbiased infbrmation is available) market participants must
also choose a course ofaction, The empirical evidence shows,
however, that decision makers exhibit systematic deviations
from ralional action wvhen making decisions under uncer-
taint)'. Hypothterical, strictly rational, valuc-iaxillizing
actors consistently make their choices on the basis of the
ultimate consequences of these choices and their probabili-
ty. What matters to rational actors is not how alternative
future outcomes relate to their present position, but only
the bottom line. Perfectly rational decision makers never
hear a risk unless it promises a sufficient increase in expect-
ed value, never embark on a course ofaction with a negative
expected value, and always chose that cotutse ofaction with
the highest forward-looking expected value, lcttitng bygones
be bygones."
In contrast to the rattional actor model, boundedly ratio-
nal, real decision makers tend to make their choices as if the
potential outcomes of these choices were gains and losses
relative to a given reference point, commonly the status quo,
instead of taking into account their overall wealth. Thus,
any alternative could be more or less attractive to different
decision makers whose current reference points differ from
one another, appearing as an attractive gain to one bt an
aversive loss to another. Losses also loom larger than gains in
people's minds, meaning decision makers are loss averse,
However, in both the loss and gain domains, decision mak-
ers reveal a diminishing sensitivit)y such that any difference
in outcomes matters less and less as outcomes move away
from the reference point (e.g., the difference between gains
of $10 and $20 seems much more significant than the for-
mally comparable difference between gains of $100 and
$1 10, even when both sums are very small compared to the
total wealth of tie decision maker).
Therefore, market participants teitd to be highly risk
averse in choosing atttiong possible gains, even in circein-
stances where rational actors would be risk netttral."0 This
boundedly rational risk aversion implies that some potentially
profitable but risky opportunities will be rejected by real
competitors, although rational actor models would expect
competitors to be risk neutral (or less risk averse) and hence
embrace these opportunities. Even more striking, the empir-
ical findings showing aveisive attitudes to ottcomes below a
reference point also suggest that decision makers will tend to
be risk seeking-in clear opposition to rational choice pre-
cepts-when choosing atnong potential losses. Because loss
avcrsion generates risk seeking for losses, market participants
will tend to take high-risk opportunities, such as predatory
pricing strategies, against the odds, in the hope of winning a
negative expected value gamble and eliminating a painful
loss.
Boundedly rational decision makers' reliance on reference
pi nts also leads them to make inconsistent choices in comn-
parable problems (i.e., two sccnarins, each with the same
expected value) if, in one situation, the outcoln is present-
ed as a possible loss and, in the other situation, as a possible
gain. Thus, when an alternative is presented once as a gain
and another time as a loss-that is, using different "frames"-
there is a resulting shift in reference points and, consequent-
ly, a change in market participants' pattern of choice, known
as "framing effects." To illustrate, in making a decision
between reorganization plaens Fo. a manufacturing firrit in tile
race of financial crisis, nanagers will be risk averse if they
think of the decision problem in terms of saving plants and
jobs (a potential gain), but risk seeking if they thitk of try-
ing to avoid losses of plants and jobs instead (a potential
loss)."
Importantly, recent studies also reveal that the effect of
fraining depends not only on whether outcomes are per-
ceived as gains or losses, hut also on the probability that dif-
feret outcomes will occur. The well-documented pattern-
of risk aversion it the domain ofgains and risk seeking in tile
domain of losses-holds for ntediutn to high probabilities.
Market participants thts tend to be risk averse when choos-
ing, say, between a sure gain of $800 and an 80 percent
chance of gaining $1000 (whose expected values are equal),
preferring the former option to the latter. Similarly, they are
risk seeking in the domain of losses, preferring an 80 percent
chance of losing $1000 to a definite loss of $800. When the
probabilities involved are stniall, however, decision makers
exhibit the opposite pattern, making risk-seeking choices for
potential gains and risk-averse choices for potential losses. For
instance, when choosing betwcen a 2 percent chance of gain-
ing $500 or a sure gain of$ 10, decision makers tend to pre-
fer the risky option. At the sante time, they also prefcr a stre
loss of $10 to a 2 percent chance of losing $500."
Often, the reliance of business decision makers on refer-
ence points and their asymmetric attitude towards gains and
losses also lead them to exhibit a bias in favor of retaining the
status quo in the face of superior alternatives that require
clhange. This phentom|enon is also partly responsible for tile
coinmon tendency to keep escalating commitments (i.e.,
resotrces) against the odds to a course of action into which
significant costs have already been suink. As with many other
behavioral phenomena, taking past actions into account is
sometimes reasonable; after all, a "totigh guy" reputation has
sonic clear economic benefits. The stink cost effect, howev-
er, extends beyond the objective value of reputation, driven
by factors such as concerns about regret and self-perception,
as well as a strong desire to achieve the goal one has corn-
intted to. This latter factor, in turn, can sometimes even
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transform such a significant goal or aspiration into a reference
point (in lieu of the typical status quo reference point). In
these circumstances, a failure to accomplish this goal will be
perceived as a loss-a painful outcome below the reference
point-as opposed to a neutral outconc ofretaining the sta-
tuts cluo.13
Section 2 Predatory Pricing
Building on the behavioral findings described here, a more
realistic approach to antitrust may arrive at different pre-
dictions of market behavior from those of models based on
the rational actor hypothesis. As an example, we can consider
the predictions of a behaviorally informed approach regard-
ing some aspects of predatory pricing, such as the threshold
recoupment requirement and the appropriate measure of
cost that makes a pricing scheme predatory. In Brooke Group
Ltd. v. Brown & W'illiamson Tobacco Corp., the Supreme
Court declared that conduct will not amount to predatory
pricing unless the alleged scheme involved pricing below
some measure of cost and the predator had a rational
prospect of recouping its losses from such below-cost pre-
darion. 4
Emphasizing the importance of the recoupment require-
ment, the Courr explained that "frJecotpinent is the ulimate
object ofan unlawful predatory pricing scheme, "25 In other
words, the ratinial managers of a profit-maximizing firm
would not engage in predation unless the monopoly profits
they expect to charge in the future, after driving the compe-
titiolt nut of the market, are sufficiently high to compensate
for their firm's certain losses from current below-cost preda-
tory sales. Ptt more precisely, rational predation must bear a
positive, risk-adjusted, tiet present value, like any other ratio-
nal inve.stment activity
2 6
According to the Chicago School's account, moreover,
predatory pricing is almost never likely to take place since
such conduct would be an irrational strategy in the face of
highly unlikely recoupment (i.e., an cx ante analysis would
result in a negative expected present value). In fact, for
recoupment to be likely the predator must have a very large
market share and barriers to entry must be high, to name but
two important conditions. However, because few alleged
predators meet the former condition and few markets meet
the latter one--or so Chicago scholars tend to believe-price
predation will rarely take place, This view has been adopted
by the Court, which declared that predatory pricing allega-
tions can be rejected summarily in the common case where
recoupment is unlikely."
Rsk-Seeking Predatory Behavior, In contrast with the
accepted wisdom on the extreme rarity of predatory pricing,
the behavioral evidence suggests that dominant firns and
monopolists consciously may engage in high-risk, negative
net present value predation under some circumstances."
Specifically, managers of dominant firms or monopolies, who
find their market share and profits continuously eroded by
the successful expansion of new entrants or small incum-
bents, arc likely to use their long-term dominance in the
market as the relevant reference point when evaluating dif-
ferent competitive strategies. The evidence on boundedly
rational choice behavior reveals that decision makers per-
ceive expected outcomes above the reference point as positive
and those below it as negative. A negative change relative to
the reference point-that is, a loss-looms large, so managers
will try harder to avoid the threatening loss from an eroding
market share, Therefore, a manager whose current competi-
tive strategy is unable to stanch a market share slide may he
inclined to engage in negative expected value predatory pric-
ing (i.e., without a rationally sufficient likelihood of recoup-
ment), 0 Such managers may he willing to take higher risks
than rational profit maximizing 1ustifies, hoping they will
succeed in reestablishing the firm's lost long-tern' market
position."
In contrast with the accepted wisdom on the
extreme rarity of predatory pricing, the behavioral
evidence suggests that dominant firms and
monopolists consciously may engage In high-risk,
negative net present value predation under
some circumstances.
In addition, once a monopolist has committed significant
resources, as well as its reputation, to a predatory campaign,
backing out ofthe predatory move would not be easy. Unlike
the hypothetical rational acror, who always ignores sink
costs and lets bygones be bygones, real world managers are
far more inclined to hold to a cotrse they have committed
to despite dim prospects for success-s lung as there are any
prospects at all-and often exhibit a tendency to escalate
commitments in the face of losses. Whether as a result of loss
aversion due to a self-serving bias in overestimating the
probability of the strategy's success, or because oft] general
overconfidence in their ability to "beat the odds," managers
are unlikely to react to a predatory scheme's lack of success
in the short term by changing course and giving up. Only
after a significant period of conri n uits losses Witluut suc-
cess will the repUtal i(rt3l and ecotnomic costs of the pattent-
ly failing scheme he likely to overwhelm managers' com-
mitment to the predatory strategy and make a painful retreat
more attractive.
3'
Nevertheless, only when faced with a medium to high
probability ofpainfitl loss (e.g., a substantial and continuing
downward slide in market share) will managers be inclined to
embark on high-risk predation campaigns. A small decline in
marker share that does not constitute a clear trend or a mere
low-prnlhahility competitive threat typically will be insitfi-
cient to generate risk seeking market behavior; in such cases,
FALL 2003 55
COVER STORIES
managers are more likely to exhibit risk aversion and limit
themselves to lower-risk competitive efforts (e.g., a new mar-
keting campaign).
The preliminary analysis here also suggests that while
dominant incumbents that are losing market share may be
prone to exhibit risk-seeking behavior, this is liru less likely to
be the case with stable incumbents. Managers of such firms
will typically view the risky prospect of eliminating :, small
competitor as promising a small potential gain, compared to
the status quo, and will not be prone to take risk-seeking
gambles in pursuing this prospect." In between the two polar
cases-of the stable incumbent on the one hand and the
dominant firm losing ground on the other-will be the large
and growing, though not yet indisputably Monopolist,
incumbent. Such firms will typically not exhibit risk-seeking
behavior, viewing their improving market position as a gain.
Nevertheless, a growing incumbent that is very close to reach-
ing a monopoly position, for example, may tend to use its
aspiration-of dominating the market-as a reference
point." In these uncommon cases, coming short of monop-
oly will be viewed as a painful loss that can generate the risk-
seeking predatory behavior more typically associated with
declining monopoliSiS.
Recoupment, Harriers, and Deterrence. The apparent
likelihood of boundedly rational, risk-sceking predatory pric-
ing by some managers of dominant firms would he of little
concern in a hypothetical market with low barriers to entry
and strictly rational, perfectly-inlormed potential entrants.
Most markets, however, do not have these characteristics. 4
Real entrants exhibit a higher rate of entry than rational
entrants would, but perform more poorly than their hypo-
therical counterparts, typically failing and exiting without
leaving a significant mark on the ,narket. lit lact, the only
entrants that appear to take into account some, though still
not all, of those market characteristics affecting their future
prospects are the few larger, often diversifying, entrants.35
A dominant firm considering a predatory move against an
expanding smaller competitor, therefore, could often expect
the period of monopoly profirs to be longer and the likeli-
hood of recoupment greater than a cursory look at the rates
of entry alone would imply."
Thus, although barriers to entry may appear low in many
markets, barriers to survival typically are high and dominant
firns often can ignore most new entrants except for those
few that are large enough to impact the market in the short
term. The ire of the predator will mote likely be directed at
the rare small incumbent (often yesteryear's siccessful
entrant) who has been able to expand rapidly and gain an
increasing, market share. 'Ie increasing success of this small,
but now noticeable, competitor is likely based on innovation
or maybe on a shift in consumer preferences, whereas the
dominant incumbent is frequently heavily invested in and
relying on extant technologies and products. Therefore, the
winds of change created or facilitated by the presence of the
expanding small competitor may threaten the dominant
firm's long-term prosperity and even survival.
The empirical data oi incntibenis' rcsponses i. enotry and
market share gain are limited, but appear to be in line with
the present analysis, suggesting that incumbents tend to
ignore entry on most occasions. Additionally, predatory
pricing cases frequently revolve around allegations made by
a sizable but smaller competitor against one or a number of
its larger counterparts. In Brooke Group, for example, plain-
tiff increased its shame from 2 it 5 p ecent of the highly con-
centrared national cigarette market by pioneering the devel-
opment of a new "generic" segment in the market. By the
time the alleged predation occurred, four years after the
introduction of the new segment, this segment had grown
fiom a fraction of a percent of the market-a share typical of
new entrants-to over 4 percent of the total market.'
Last, bonridedly rational predation occasionally may be
more rational than it appears it first sight. Tile mere hypo-
thetical knowledge that predatory pricing is likely not a ratio-
nal investment strategy may not suffice to cnnvincc acttal or
potential competitors to expose themselves to a risk-seeking
incumbent making credible, ifboundedly rational, commit-
ments to a predatory strategy." Moreover, a risk-seeking
predator may benefit from the fact that, in reality, its com-
petitors are boundedly rational as well. For instance, the
availability bias will tend to make highly puiblicized, colorlitl
instances of predation stand out in the imagination and
nemory of market participants. This effect Inay sometimes
be reinfiorced rhrotigh the law of small numbers, which can
lead potential entrants to overestimate the risks of piedation
based on a small sample of cases and without stnfficiently tak-
ing into account the objective difiCLies and costs fiCing the
predator, as well as due to the pervasive tendency to over-
weight events of known, small probability. The resulting rep-
urational benefit of certain predatory campaigns may there-
fore be significantly greater than a traditional account deems,
making seemingly risk-seeking predation more rational than
it appears.
The Need for Further Analysis. While the preceding
sectinns ilhistrate how a behavioral framework can lead to
different conclusions fiom those based on perfect rationali-
ty assumptions, the present analysis does not seek ftully to
resolve the predatory pricing debate. Specifically, a numiniber
of questions with important implications for policy and doc-
trine remain open for further inquiry. For instance, the
"below cost" component of predatory pricing must also be
examined, since a discrepancy between the subjective per-
ceptions of market participants and objective tests may lead
narke participants-be it the predator, the target, or other
comlpeitors-to believe that predatory pricing is taking place
in cases where objective measures show the pricing is above
cost.4t Another related question is whether and, if so, when
stch subjective predation may )e anticompemitive and harm-
ful to consumers, as opposed to a phtnomntnt that nerely
leads to lower pricing for limited time periods.
In addition, the evidence on the impact of behavioral
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forces, such as a limited tendency fin" risk-seeking predation
among some monopolists, does not absolve us firoIn the need
to examine the reCoupient question altogcther. The coin-
monly found risk seeking for perceived losses is not without
limits; the greater the necessary investment in predation and
the more renote its success, the less likely it is that evn a dcs-
perate monopolist will use it to gain lost ground in an effort
to re-establish the status quo. Consequently, the same eco-
nonic factors that make rational predation more likely-
such as the objective magnitude of barriers to entry, the
potential to benefit from a predatory reputation across mul-
tiple markets, or tie disciplinary use of predatory pricing to
punish defectors in aii oligopol istic pricing setting--remain
significant (or a behaviorally informed approach to predation
as well.
That said, the behavioral approach to antitrusr law and
economics does reveal that predatory pricing may be inore
likely than rational actor models predict, at least in specific
settings. Therefore, in rhese limtited circumstaices, sumit-
ry judgment against allegations of predatory pricing may not
be warranted even where the Chicago School account would
lead one to believe that recoupment is unlikely. In these
cases, a more careful examination of ite factial evidence
would be necessary to determine whether risk-seeking pre-
dation is at all likely and whether the behavioral economies
of recoupment are at least such that a loss aversive, risk-
seeking decision maker would potentially find predatory
pricing attractive.
Conclusion
The behavioral approach to antitrust law and economics is
in its incipiency, yet shows promise. By applying scientific
findings on human judgment and decision making, this
aplproach provides better descriptions of marker participants'
behavior and potentially better prescriptions for antitrust
policy. Even while retaining the traditional law and eco-
nomics vicw-tha antitrust law should focus on allocative
efficiency-the behavioral appiroach can provide a more
realistic grounding for detertining the likelihood and com-
petitive effect of different business practices.
However, a behavioral approach to antitrust lw would
still emphasize the need for administrability of doctrine, tak-
ing into account the costs of litigation and judicial error.
which sometimes necessitate the adoption of tore restrained
antitrust doctrines even in the face of non-negligible anti-
competitive effects in the real-world. Nevertheless, even in
these cases a more accurate understanding of market behav-
ior could benefit antitrust law by highlighting the significant
tradeuffs involved.
Finally, a behaviorally informed approach must surmount
a numher nf additional obstacles that are common to all
hiuavinral applications concerning firm and market behav-
ior in order to gain broad acceptance by antitrust scholars
arid courts. In market settings, traditional economists tend
to believe market forces, arbitrage, institutional design, and
learning can eliminate bourndedly rational behavior from the
market. If this were comtrronly the case, the behavioral
insights on choice and decision making would be of little
import for anrirrust scholarship. Fmpirical evidence and
simple logic reveal, however, that while tire various mecha-
nisms relied on by traditional economists often constrain
boundedly rational behavior and mitigate its effects, the
efficacy of these forces is limited in most real world
inarkets.4" El
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UNDER UNCERAmi1Y: HUlnSIICS ANO BIASES 3 (Daniel Kotlnernai et it.
ads., 1982) istatling, In an early formulrtion of Ulu authors' highly influen.
tial 'heuristics and blases" research paradigm, that 'people rely on a lim
tied numhor of heuristic principles which reduce the complex task of assess-
ing probabilities and predicting values to simpler judgmental Operalions In
general, those heuristics are quite useful, but sometimes they lead to
severe aid systematic erros"). See also Christilne Jols et al., A Beravloral
Approach to Law and Economics, 50 Sra, L. RLy. 1471, 1477 (1998) ("peo-
ple sometimes respond rationally to their own cognitive lunitationas ....
blur even with these remedies, Find In some cases lIacaeuo of these rerrie
dies, human behavior differs in systematic ways from that predicted by the
standard economic model of unbounded rationality). For Instructive reviews
of his vast literature, see, e.g., Colin F. Camorer, Individual Dncision M, kng,
In 1 THE HANDUOUK O EXPERIMcTAL ECONoMIC5 587 (John H. Kagel & Alvin
E. Roth ods., 1995); Robyn M. Dawes, Behavlirul Decision Making amd
Judgment, In THF HA4asooK or SOCIAL PSYCHOLOoY 497 (Daniel 1, Gilbert at
at. ads., 4th ad. 1998).
See. e.g., Jells at al., surpra note 4 (offering 'a broad vision of how law and
economics may he Improved by Increasing Its attention to Insights about
actual human behavior" and replacing the assumptions of unbounded ratio.
nality, soil-interest. and will-power); Russell B. Korobkin & Thomas S. Ulan,
Law aind Behlavioral Sciecrce: Rrovig the Reliot)tfily Assumpionl frorr Law
and Economics, 88 CAL. L. REv. 1051 (20001 (examining the rota ol the rutio.
net actor In law and economics end surggesting replacing Itwith a behaviorally
Informed actor).
FALL 2 D 0 3 5 7
COVER STORIES
6 Although many of the behavioral findings discussed here have been repli,
cted in market settings or with financial incentives for performance, the evi-
dence largely refers to Individual or small-group decision making, Therefore,
further empirical studies of the complex Inleraction between robust individ-
ual-level phenomena and organizational forces would allow for a better
analysis of o broader rango of business practices than is currently possible.
I For otr recent applicationr of behavioral insights to the analysis oi nurkut
behavior ia antitrust law and economics, see Avisthaloy" Tor, Tie Fable of
Entry: Bounded Rsllonally, Market Discipline, and Legal Policy, 101 MICH, L.
Rev. 482 (2002)
1See, e.g., PosNrn, suipra note I (explaining the omission of the first edition's
subtitle "an economic perspective" by saying that i the intervening years--
troin 1967 to the presen|t-the other approaches to antitrust law trove
largely fallen away, and speaking of "a profound, a revolutionary change in
law* where "JtJoday, antitrust law Is a body of economically rational prin-
ciplos . . .); Frank H. Eastcrbrook, Allocating Anlitrust Decisionmaking
tusks, 76 Gco. L.J. 305, 30511987) ('Antitruat law has become a branch
of induslriut organatlor, itself a bratch of ecoriontics.').
I Sea supre note 1. The alternative would be (or strictly rational market par-
ticipants to he utllity.maxlmlhlng without maximizing profits, and their behav.
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of abovacost predation, a topic of recent debate in the legal literature. See,
e.g., Aaron S, Edlin, StoppingAbveCosr PredatoryPricing. 111 t E LJ. 941
j2002) (arguing that above cost pricing can be predatory); Einer Efitauge, Wiy
Above Cost Price Cuts to Drive Out Eriraids Are Not Predatory-und the
Implicaiors for Duflinirg Costs end Market Power. 112 YALE LJ. 681 (2003)
(reviewing tile state of the law and scholarship and arguing against pro-
hibiting above-cost price cuts.
"See, e.g., Tor, The Fable of Entry, sepra note 7, at 531-33 (showing how the
bounded rationality of competitors can impact market oulcomes even under
Intense competition), 561-63 (highlighting tIre limits of arguments relying o
markets to eliminate bounded rationality); see generally ANueti SaLlIrER,
IHErriciENt MAREIs: An INioUuucioN to BLeHAVIOrAL FINANCE (2000);
Nichiolas Barbells & Richard Thater, A Survey of Behevioral Finance 3-11
(unpublished manuscript, Sept. 2002, Univ. of Chicago), available at
http://paper.srrn.cnm/s1o3/papers.cfm?abstract-ld=332266 (reviewing
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